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Hawthorne Effect: An Explanation Based on
Decision Theory
Sofia Holguin, Vladik Kreinovich, and Nguyen Hoang Phuong

Abstract It is known that people feel better (and even work better) if someone pays
attention to them; this is known as the Hawthorne effect. At first glance, it sounds
counter-intuitive: this attention does not bring you any material benefits, so why
would you feel better? If you are sick and someone gives you medicine, this will
make you feel better, but if someone just pays attention, why does that make you
feel better? In this paper, we use the general ideas of decision theory to explain this
seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon.

1 Formulation of the Problem
What is Hawthorne effect. If someone helps a person, this usually makes this person happier. Interestingly, if this someone does not actually help, but simply expresses some interest in this person’s problem, this also makes the person happier.
For example, when a research team comes to study not-very-comfortable working
conditions, this very attention already makes the workers happier – and even boosts
their productivity, although the working conditions have not improved and there is
no specific plan to improve them. Similarly, the very attention to a sick person makes
this person feel better, even though this attention does not lead to any improvement
of the health situation. This phenomenon was first documented in a factory called
Hawthorne Works. Because of this fact, this effect is known as the Hawthorne effect;
see, e.g., [1] and references therein.
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It should be mentioned that the feeling-better phenomenon only occurs when the
people paying attention have a positive attitude toward the folks they pay attention
to. Definitely, if a team would come to analyze the workers for the potential purpose
of making them work harder for the same pay, this attention would not make the
workers feel better or be more productive.
Why Hawthorne effect? At first glance, this phenomenon sounds counter-intuitive:
why would workers feel better if some strangers whom they see for the first time and
probably not see again simply study their working conditions? Ok, people crave for
attention, but the increase in happiness and productivity is disproportionate: it is
comparable to a similar increase caused by the actual improvement in the working
conditions.
How can we explain this seemingly counter-intuitive phenomenon? In this paper,
we analyze this situation from the viewpoint of decision theory and show that, within
this theory, the Hawthorne effect can indeed be naturally explained.

2 Our Explanation
Decision theory: a brief reminder. To come up with the desired explanation, let us
recall the main ideas behind decision theory; see, e.g., [2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10]. Decision
theory studies decisions made by rational people, i.e., people whose preferences are
consistent: e.g., if a person prefers an alternative A to alternative B and prefers alternative B to some other alternative C, then, when presented with a choice between A
and C, this person should select A.
It turns out that under such consistency conditions, decisions of such a rational
person can be described by a number-valued function u(A) called utility so that out
of several alternatives A1 , . . . , An , the person always select an alternative with the
largest possible value of utility.
A person’s utility may depend not only on the objective circumstances of this
person, but also on the utilities of others. This dependence is usually described by a
linear formula:
(0)
ui = ui + ∑ αi j · u j ,
j

(0)
ui

where
is the utility corresponding to the person i’s objective circumstances, and
the coefficients αi j describe i’s attitude towards person j; see, e.g., [8] and references
therein.
For collective decision making, the optimal solution – according to decision theory – is to maximize the product of utilities; this is known as Nash’s bargaining
solution; see, e.g., [5, 6, 7].
Let us apply decision theory to our situation. Let us consider a simplified situation, in which we have two persons: the main Person 1 and another Person 2 who
starts expressing interest in Person 1.
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We want to describe how this interest affects the happiness of Person 1. In general, according to decision theory, this happiness is determined by the overall decision a. In general, the state of each system – and, in particular, each decision – can
be described by providing numerical values of all the characteristics describing this
state or this decision. So, in mathematical terms, each decision can be described by
a tuple of the corresponding numerical values a = (a1 , . . . , ak , . . .).
At first, before the interest starts, the collective decision f is determined by maximizing the product of the utilities of these folks:
u1 ( f ) · u2 ( f ) = max u1 (a) · u2 (a).

(1)

a

Once the Person 2 starts getting positively interested in Person 1, the utility of Person 2 changes from its original value u2 (a) to the new value u2 (a) + α · u1 (a) for
some positive number α > 0. We consider the case when this interest is mostly professional, so its intensity is not high: α ≪ 1. Since the utility of Person 2 changes,
the collective solution also changes, now we select an alternative s that maximizes
the product of new utilities:
u1 (s) · (u2 (s) + α · u1 (s)) = max u1 (a) · (u2 (a) + α · u1 (a)).
a

(2)

In these terms, the Hawthorne effect means that this interest makes Person 1
happier, i.e., that
u1 (s) > u1 ( f ).
(3)
Let us see if we can explain this effect.
Towards an explanation. According to calculus, the fact that the expression (1)
attains its maximum for a = f means that the derivatives of this expression over all
components ak of a are equal to 0:
∂ (u1 (a) · u2 (a))
= 0.
∂ ak
|a= f

(4)

At the point a = f , the derivative dk of the new objective function
u1 (a) · (u2 (a) + α · u1 (a)) = u1 (a) · u2 (a) + α · (u1 (a))2

(5)

with respect to the component ak is equal to
def

dk =

∂ (u1 (a) · (u2 (a) + α · u1 (a)))
=
∂ ak
|a= f

∂ u1 (a) · u2 (a) + α · (u1 (a))2
∂ ak


=
|a= f

∂ α · (u1 (a))2
∂ (u1 (a) · u2 (a))
+
∂ ak
∂ ak
|a= f


.
|a= f

(6)
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At the point a = f , the first term in the sum (6) is, according to the formula (4),
equal to 0, so
dk =


∂ u1 (a)
∂
α · (u1 (a))2 |a= f = 2α · u1 ( f ) ·
.
∂ ak
∂ ak |a= f

(7)

Depending of the sign of the last derivative in the formula (7), we have two possible
cases: either this derivative is positive (or, strictly speaking, non-negative) or it is
negative. Let us consider both cases one by one.
Case when the derivative is positive. Let us first consider the case when the derivative is positive, i.e., when
∂ u1 (a)
> 0.
(8)
∂ ak |a= f
Since u1 ( f ) > 0 and α > 0, this means that the derivative dk is also positive – so, if
we increase the value ak , we get a larger value of the product of the utilities. So, to
get to the new maximum s, we need to increase ak .
In this case, due to (8), the value of the utility u1 (a) will also increase – i.e., in
commonsense terms, Person 1 will be happier in the new state s than in the original
state s.
Case when the derivative is negative. Let us now consider the case when the
derivative is negative, i.e., when
∂ u1 (a)
< 0.
∂ ak |a= f

(9)

Since u1 ( f ) > 0 and α > 0, this means that the derivative dk is also negative – so, if
we decrease the value ak , we get a larger value of the product of the utilities. So, to
get to the new maximum s, we need to decrease ak .
In this case, due to (9), the value of the utility u1 (a) will also increase – i.e., in
commonsense terms, Person 1 will be happier in the new state s than in the original
state s.
Conclusion. In both cases, the mere fact that Person 2 starts expressing interest in
Person 1 increases the happiness level of Person 1 – which is exactly the Hawthorne
effect.
Thus, this seemingly counter-intuitive effect indeed naturally follows from decision theory.
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